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Abstract: How do authoritarian governments learn? What kind of 
events and experiences can lead them to adopt more or less restrict-
ive policies towards social actors? And, how are such lessons from 
others’ experiences integrated into new policies? These questions 
have been addressed and answered quite differently from various 
disciplinary perspectives, focusing either on international dynamics 
such as “authoritarian diffusion” or on domestic policy learning. This 
article seeks to integrate different perspectives on authoritarian learn-
ing by proposing a typological framework of positive and negative 
learning from three distinct sources: authoritarian peers, democratic 
countries, and subnational policy experiments. I argue that such a 
comprehensive framework better accounts for both the relative im-
portance and for the interaction of different kinds of learning in nation-
al-level policy processes. To illustrate the framework’s added analyt-
ical value, I use an exemplary case study of recent legislative changes 
to China’s civil society policy, which have been alternatively inter-
preted as part of an authoritarian “wave” or as another step in incre-
mental domestic learning processes. 
 Manuscript received 6 January 2019; accepted 4 June 2019 
Keywords: China, authoritarian diffusion, non-governmental organi-
sations, charity, policy learning 
Bertram Lang, M.A., is a research associate and doctoral candidate 
at the Institute for Political Science of Goethe University Frankfurt, 
Germany. His current research mainly focuses on Chinese philan-
thropy in the transnational context, as well as on the politics of cor-
ruption and anti-corruption. Besides his academic research, he regu-
larly consults international non-profit organisations on issues related 
to civil society work in and with China.  
E-mail: <b.lang@soz.uni-frankfurt.de> 
  148 Bertram Lang 

,QWURGXFWLRQ
The apparent global “democratic recession” (Diamond 2015) and the 
growth of restrictions on civil society actors in many countries have 
led to an unprecedented academic interest in the potential causal links 
between new authoritarian policies in different countries. However, 
the opacity of authoritarian policymaking and the often exclusive 
focus on international dynamics in the International Relations (IR) 
literature make it impossible to ascertain the relative importance of 
these external factors as explanatory variables for the global “wave of 
repression against NGOs” (Bank and Josua 2017: 4) – or authoritari-
an policymaking more broadly. On the other end of the spectrum, 
area specialists studying authoritarian systems tend to focus on the 
specific domestic pathways of state–society relations in each country 
and thus explain policy changes as idiosyncratic outcomes of domes-
tic long-term developments. In the case of China studies, this has led 
to a great wealth of literature on the emergence of a specifically Chi-
nese model of post-socialist state–society relations, conceptualised 
alternatively as “consultative authoritarianism” (Teets 2013), “social 
corporatism” (Han 2016), “hidden rules” (Deng 2010), “state-spon-
sored engagement” (Whiting 1991: 17), or “dependent interdepend-
ence” (Zhang 2015). 
Considering the respective contributions and limitations of both 
IR and country-specific approaches, I ask how these various takes can 
be usefully combined to provide a more comprehensive account of 
learning processes in authoritarian systems. My core argument is that 
international (or, top-down) and domestic (or, bottom-up) perspec-
tives on national-level policymaking need to be more systematically 
combined to increase the analytical value of the “authoritarian learn-
ing” concept and derive a more nuanced understanding of policy 
change in related countries. The article proposes a typological frame-
work which distinguishes between six qualitatively different types of 
authoritarian learning along two dimensions – namely, the source of 
learning and the (positive or negative) types of lesson drawn. 
To substantiate my theoretical argument and illustrate the pertin-
ence of the proposed multi-level framework, the empirical part of the 
article will focus on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) civil soci-
ety policy as an exemplary case of authoritarian learning. In empirical-
ly applying the conceptual framework, I will ask a) which types of 
learning are most relevant and b) how they came together to drive 
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recent changes in the Chinese party state’s national-level regulation of 
civil society actors. This case study can provide important insights 
into authoritarian learning for several reasons. The PRC has been 
frequently described as a learning authoritarian system from both 
domestic (Florini, Lai, and Tan 2012; Heilmann 2008a; Nathan 2009; 
Simon 2008) and international (Song 2010; Liu and Wang 2018; Yang 
and Ortmann 2018; Zhang and Marsh 2015) perspectives.  
With the adoption of two new laws regulating the civil society 
sector in 2016, this policy field displays a significant degree of recent 
change that is in need of explanation. Notably the “Law on the Ad-
ministration of Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions in Mainland China” (hereafter, Foreign NGO or FNGO Law) 
represents an exemplary case of the rift between analytical perspec-
tives, having been viewed as part of a global “wave” of repressive 
laws against international civil society organisations (ICSOs) and 
attributed to learning from “Russia’s bad example” (Hooper and 
Frolov 2016) from an IR perspective (Bank and Josua 2017: 4; 
Carothers 2016). For some China specialists, meanwhile, it is seen as 
“a tactical move in a long-term strategy” (Hsu and Teets 2016). An-
other advantage for demonstration purposes is that China is a rela-
tively transparent regime by authoritarian standards, due to a prolific 
bureaucratic apparatus whose well-documented communications and 
policy drafts provide material for tracing policy processes over time. 
This is particularly so for the Charity Law, which was passed in 
March 2016 after decade-long deliberations – with input and “public 
comments” sought from both domestic and foreign experts and prac-
titioners.  
After a review of the literature on authoritarian policy learning 
and a methodological note, I will first explain the proposed typologi-
cal framework – integrating learning from authoritarian, democratic, 
and subnational examples – and then apply it to the study of Chinese 
civil society regulations.  
$XWKRULWDULDQ'LIIXVLRQDQG/HDUQLQJ
For decades, the literature on international diffusion processes fo-
cused primarily on that of liberalism and (neo-)liberal policies (Sim-
mons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Dob-
bin, Simmons, and Garrett authoritatively highlighted “Social Con-
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struction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning” (2007) as the most 
popular mechanisms examined in the different theoretical strands of 
the public policy diffusion literature. However, the mechanisms in-
volved in the diffusion of authoritarian policies are not necessarily the 
same. Thus a growing body of IR literature has focused specifically 
on “authoritarian diffusion,” pointing to several mechanisms through 
which illiberal policies in one country can increase the likelihood of 
similar policies emerging in another. They include direct authoritarian 
collaboration (von Soest 2015), democratic norm erosion (Cooley 
2015), the rise of illiberal regional powers (Risse and Babayan 2015) 
or “authoritarian great powers” (Gat 2007) – and, most importantly, 
authoritarian learning (Ambrosio 2010; Hall and Ambrosio 2017; 
Heydemann and Leenders 2011; Koesel and Bunce 2013).  
Explicitly in response to common assumptions in liberal policy 
diffusion studies, Tosun and Croissant (2016) argue for renewed 
sensitivity towards the role of regime types of both source and target 
countries in international diffusion processes. Their comparative 
findings suggest that what they dub the “international route” – pres-
sure or incentives by international organisations or other states – is 
most relevant for the diffusion of policies from democracies to au-
tocracies. Due to active Western “democracy-promotion” efforts, this 
route has arguably played an important role in the diffusion of liberal, 
pro-market policies (Risse and Babayan 2015). However, while Tosun 
and Croissant do not distinguish between the type of “policy innova-
tion” (liberal or illiberal), there is little compelling evidence of author-
itarian policies being similarly “coerced” upon others through ideolo-
gy-based “autocracy promotion” (Tansey 2016; Bank 2017). Thus, 
this article will focus on the “bureaucratic route” (Tosun and Crois-
sant 2016: 536) of unilateral, voluntary learning, which appears most 
likely in the case of authoritarian, illiberal policies (Erdmann et al. 
2013: 24). 
Policy learning commonly refers to changes in policymakers’ be-
liefs about cause-and-effect relationships, which subsequently lead 
them to adjust their own policies (Elkins and Simmons 2005). 
Whereas Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett differentiate neatly between 
constructivist diffusion theories about social acceptance or ritualistic 
mimicking (2007: 451–454) and evidence-based learning approaches 
implying rational cost–benefit analyses (2007: 463), I contend that 
both angles are compatible insofar as collective learning processes 
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always involve both a rational and a social component. As the authors 
themselves concede, the “lessons learned are not always the right 
lessons” (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007: 460) – be it because 
of imperfect information or social factors inherent to decision-
making. Ambrosio (2010) similarly points to “appropriateness” and 
“effectiveness” as key dynamics in the ongoing “reverse wave” against 
democratisation. First, governments could feel encouraged to violate 
liberal norms by adopting restrictive measures against CSOs because 
other regimes’ similar policies previously contributed to their global 
erosion (Cooley 2015), thereby decreasing the reputational costs for 
potential followers. Second, examples of effective restrictions can 
serve as direct models for other autocrats who “identify what they 
perceive to be a problem and then begin ‘scanning the international 
environment’ for apparent solutions” (Ambrosio 2010: 382). 
In the case of reform-era China, Hu Aiqin (2012) has similarly 
demonstrated how the fundamental transformation of China’s 
healthcare system since the 1980s followed globally diffused neo-
liberal models. This has been based on a combination of international 
reputational drivers and on strategically oriented learning among Chi-
nese policymakers. Analysing the evolution of the Chinese local state’s 
approaches towards civil society actors, Teets further highlighted the 
causal relevance of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres’ beliefs, 
which she shows are shaped by both “strategic” ideas – meaning 
pragmatic considerations of material benefits and disadvantages – and 
“‘modular’ ideas, derived from successful international and domestic 
state–society models” (Teets 2013: 19–20). 
5HVHDUFK$SSURDFK
Concerning the methodology of authoritarian diffusion and learning 
studies, Erdmann et al. (2013: 19) rightly criticise the fact that transfer 
processes often remain a “black box” empirically, with analyses fo-
cusing mostly on output convergence between regimes over time. 
However, many of the authors’ best practice examples (2013: 23–25) 
amount more to anecdotal evidence of direct exchanges between 
leaders than to a systematic research programme. Logically speaking, 
studies of policy learning need to provide evidence that policymakers 
previously had both a (strategic/material) motive and opportunities 
(i.e. available information about possible models) for learning. The 
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challenge remains that most direct consultations between authoritari-
an governments are opaque, and collective learning is hard to observe 
as a cognitive process. Instead, I propose to minimise the black box 
of authoritarian learning and decision-making by pragmatically look-
ing for indirect indicators of bureaucratic learning. These include: 
 official and unofficial policy debates surrounding the legislative 
process and policy implementation, 
 policy output (legal content), as well as 
 policy implementation and communication vis-à-vis domestic 
and international audiences. 
Such broad-based, longitudinal policy process-tracing requires a var-
ied toolbox, and necessarily deals with data from a diverse range of 
sources (George and Bennett 2005: 206–207). In the present case, 
official policy debates can be analysed based on government commu-
nications, CCP leaders’ quotes, as well as on reports and comments 
appearing in authoritative party-state media outlets. As a proxy for 
unofficial policy debates, I rely mainly on Chinese-language academic 
publications, which regularly take a practice-oriented approach and 
make concrete suggestions for policy reform – reflecting social scien-
tists’ designated role as providers of “constructive” policy input in 
China’s governance system. The evolution of policy content can be 
directly observed from legal and regulatory texts over time. Chinese 
lawmakers even provide official “interpretation notes,” serving as 
guidelines for interpretation and implementation. As for implementa-
tion practice, the evidence at this early stage remains more anecdotal 
and based only on background interviews with stakeholders from 
civil society and on media reports. Finally, the analysis of policy 
communication relies on government reports and Chinese media 
articles published since 2016. 
7RZDUGVDQ,QWHJUDWLYH7\SRORJ\RI
$XWKRULWDULDQ/HDUQLQJ
Based on the above considerations, the following discussion focuses 
on authoritarian policy learning as a conscious albeit not necessarily 
efficient process within governments which “look to others for 
[transferable] policies and rules that effectively solved similar prob-
lems elsewhere” (Börzel and Risse 2012: 9). This can involve a trans-
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fer across jurisdictions within the same country (domestic learning) or 
an emulation of policies observed in other ones (transnational learn-
ing) (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000). Since policy learning in adaptable 
regimes such as China takes place constantly and from many different 
sources, I suggest breaking down the somewhat artificial limitation to 
learning between authoritarian regimes – which remains common in 
the authoritarian diffusion literature – in favour of a more compre-
hensive typology of authoritarian learning along two nominal dimen-
sions (see Table 1 below). 
The first dimension of the proposed conceptual framework re-
lates to the source of policy learning. This can be other authoritarian 
governments, either through direct leadership and bureaucratic ex-
changes – or by studying how other leaders have dealt with similar 
challenges. But, second, sources for authoritarian policy learning can 
also be found in democratic states, especially when it comes to policy 
field-specific, more technical issues rather than the fundamental pol-
ity ones that are usually the focus of democratisation scholars. Third, 
a less biased understanding of policy-learning sources requires con-
sideration of international and domestic sources in conjunction. 
From a China Studies perspective, it is quite natural that national-
level policymakers turn to domestic sources – namely, provincial and 
local governments – for lessons about which policies result in desired 
outcomes and are worth imitating. How these domestic lessons inter-
act with parallel and potentially contradictory lessons from abroad, 
however, remains an understudied question. 
The second dimension of the framework, meanwhile, concerns 
how positive and negative learning should be seen as two clearly dis-
tinct processes with different underlying mechanisms. The two at-
tributes are used here in a purely descriptive and not a normative 
sense (cf. the discussion of positive and negative social learning by 
Boehmke and Witmer 2004): Positive learning refers to strategies of 
looking for useful policy models – or benchmarks – in other jurisdic-
tions, and subsequently adapting these lessons to the national con-
text. Negative learning – that is, trying to avoid mistakes and undesir-
able outcomes observed elsewhere – often operates through signal-
ling effects and tends to be more abstract in nature since direct learn-
ing from the unsuccessful source state – in extremis, from a toppled 
autocratic regime – is seldom possible. In short, positive learning 
comprises efforts to replicate; negative learning, meanwhile, denotes 
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those seeking to avoid the replication of policies and outcomes ob-
served elsewhere. Based on these reflections, Table 1 provides an 
overview of the six types of authoritarian learning – along with typical 
examples for how they can operate in the realm of civil society regu-
lations. 
7DEOH 7\SHVRI$XWKRULWDULDQ/HDUQLQJZLWK7\SLFDO([DPSOHVIRU&LYLO
6RFLHW\5HJXODWLRQV
Learning by authoritarian 
governments Positive Negative 
From other authoritarian 
states 
Successful “diffusion-
proofing” techniques 
for civil society control 
 
Observed usefulness 
of CSOs in certain 
policy fields; models of 
“harmonious” state–
society cooperation 
Signalling effect of  
authoritarian regime 
collapses in the face of  
public contestation 
 
Observation of auto-
cratic regimes’ failed 
repression of civil 
society 
From democratic states Imitation of  “useful” 
civil society functions, 
e.g. service provision 
by CSOs, charity 
 
Integration of CSOs 
into foreign policy to 
boost “soft power” 
Avoidance of observed 
oppositional or  
destabilising role of 
CSOs in democracies 
From domestic experiences/ 
subnational models 
Local-level policy 
innovation; 
coordinated policy 
experiments at 
subnational level 
 
Imitation and propaga-
tion of local regulatory 
models which achieved 
central state goals 
Trial-and-error 
policymaking:  
 
Unsuccessful local 
experiments 
 
Critical review of 
policies that backfired 
or created “instability” 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
The remainder of this article will focus on Chinese civil society policy-
making as an exemplary case, applying the typological framework to 
examine the sources and mechanisms of change in national-level 
regulations. 
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/HDUQLQJDQG/HVVRQ'UDZLQJLQ&KLQHVH
3ROLF\PDNLQJ
“China can be described 
as a ‘learning state’ which has adapted 
to changing conditions and 
frequently turned outward for lessons.” 
(Yang and Ortmann 2018: 946) 
Since the breakdown of many other communist regimes, the PRC’s 
apparent “authoritarian resilience” (Nathan 2009) has frequently been 
explained with the regime’s extraordinary learning and adaptation 
capacity. This policy learning is adequately characterised as “authori-
tarian learning,” since its overarching purpose has always been to (re-) 
legitimise and ensure the longevity of one-party rule and thus to pre-
vent a popular challenge to CCP power. Before examining the role of 
authoritarian learning in the civil society field, it will be useful to first 
briefly highlight the general relevance and mechanisms of learning 
from each of the three aforementioned sources – other autocracies, 
democratic countries, and subnational experiences. 
&KLQD¶V,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HDUQLQJIURP$XWRFUDFLHV
Regarding the struggles among China’s leaderships over the future 
development path and necessary policy reforms since 1989, the Soviet 
Union’s collapse would undoubtedly play a crucial role (Marsh 2003). 
The core lesson of this daunting historical example for the CCP was 
that “Gorbachev got it wrong” by initiating political liberalisation 
before accomplishing economic reforms to improve material living 
standards. More recently Xi Jinping drew his own lessons from the 
Soviet Communist Party’s collapse, arguing that: 
[This is] a profound lesson for us! To dismiss […] Lenin and Sta-
lin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism, 
and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the Party’s organiza-
tions on all levels. (China Digital Times 2013)  
In this narrative, the abandonment of Communist Party control over 
state and societal institutions was responsible for the USSR’s disinte-
gration, which is why CCP organs and Party cells now need to be 
reinvigorated at all levels. Further negative models with a profound 
impact on Chinese policy debates were the “Colour Revolutions” in 
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Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) as well as the 
“Arab Spring” that began in 2011 (Wang Zhen 2012). In light of 
apparent protest diffusion from one society to another, authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world quickly learned from each other – includ-
ing through direct cooperation (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). In 
China, the signalling effect of such an unexpected occurrence of 
“democratic contagion” shook up an already insecure CCP ahead of a 
momentous power transition in 2012/2013, as the rigorous repres-
sion of even innocuous allusions to “jasmine flowers” impressively 
demonstrated. Negative learning in terms of “diffusion-proofing” 
(Koesel and Bunce 2013), meaning trying to prevent similar instances 
of popular contestation at all costs, has thus constituted a powerful 
motivation for policy changes – particularly since 2011. 
Regarding China’s positive learning from authoritarian examples, 
the literature has overwhelmingly concentrated on Singapore. Like-
wise, Singaporean intellectuals have prominently touted their own 
country as a model for China – since this obviously bolsters Singa-
pore’s own international standing. In several policy areas, the “Singa-
pore Model” (ᯠ࣐එ⁑ᔿ, Xinjiapo moshi) has been openly acknow-
ledged by Chinese intellectuals and leaders as an example worth fol-
lowing. On Baidu Baike, China’s state-sanctioned online dictionary, 
this model is glamorously defined as referring to “a country with 
political democracy, clean politics, civilised society, a thriving econ-
omy, a happy and harmonious people, and an excellent environment”  
(ањ᭯⋫≁ѫǃ᭯ᓌ␵ᓹǃ⽮Պ᮷᰾ǃ㓿⍾㑱㦓ǃӪ≁ᒨ⾿઼䉀ǃ
⧟ຳՈ㖾ഭᓖ , Yi ge zhengzhi minzhu, zhengfu qinglian, shehui wenming, 
jingji fanrong, renmin xingfu hexie, huanjing youmei guodu) (Baidu Baike 
2019). The continued popularity of the Singaporean governance sys-
tem has been demonstrated in a recent survey among Chinese mid-
level cadres (Liu and Wang 2018). China’s attempts to learn from 
Singapore in terms of culture and ideology (the “Asian values” de-
bate), the use of semi-competitive elections, and, most importantly, 
anti-corruption policies have, however, remained largely unsuccessful 
to date (Thompson and Ortmann 2018). 
'HPRFUDWLF&RXQWULHVDV3ROLF\0RGHOV
The far more important positive models for policymakers in reform-
era China have arguably been Western democratic countries. Apply-
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ing an institutional policy transplantation model, de Jong (2017: 91) 
has highlighted the extraordinary effectiveness of Chinese policy-
makers’ selective, creative, flexible, and critical learning from Western 
models. Zhang and Marsh (2015) have traced the many ways in which 
Chinese leaders and lower-level officials learned lessons on market 
liberalisation, decentralisation, new public management, or, more 
recently, “public service-oriented government.” Song (2010) has 
demonstrated that European countries are the most frequently ana-
lysed and commended foreign models in Chinese social science stud-
ies, across many policy areas. Huotari and Heep (2016), meanwhile, 
have shown how Chinese policymakers consciously “learned geoeco-
nomics” by experimenting with various elements gleaned from West-
ern countries and international institutions. 
China’s international rise and its burgeoning great power ambi-
tions also mean that Chinese intellectual and political elites have 
turned to the United States model of “global hegemony” (ޘ⨳䵨ᵳ, 
quanqiu baquan) in search of elements that could be adapted to suit 
China’s own global leadership aspirations. As a result, the US-
originating concepts of “soft power” and “public diplomacy” have 
been integrated into official Chinese foreign policy discourse (Sham-
baugh 2013). However the US’s democratic polity, which allows for a 
diverse set of governmental and non-governmental actors to partici-
pate in foreign policy, means that both soft power and public diplo-
macy inherently grant an important role to society. Despite their par-
tial reinterpretation in the Chinese context to emphasise CCP leader-
ship (Wang 2011) the concepts’ underlying ideas have not been com-
pletely diluted with the transfer thereto, as the analysis below will 
show. 
'RPHVWLF/HDUQLQJDQG3ROLF\'LIIXVLRQ
0HFKDQLVPV
The case of China offers an unusual wealth of empirical studies on 
domestic policy learning, ones which have, however, not hitherto 
been adequately reflected in the China-related IR literature. While 
China scholars hold differing views on the power dynamics between 
national and subnational policymakers, there is broad agreement on 
the fact that throughout China’s reform and opening-up era, new 
policies were regularly tried out at the local or provincial level and 
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revised based on learning from these experiences before being im-
plemented nationwide (Zhu 2012; Florini, Lai, and Tan 2012). Heil-
mann distinguishes the Chinese model of deliberate “experimentation 
under hierarchy” from “spontaneous policy diffusion,” to explain the 
“emergence of an unexpectedly adaptive authoritarianism” (Heilmann 
2008b: 2). Policy experimentation, which he sees as a key to China’s 
fundamental economic and institutional reforms, is thus a process 
that stimulates “comprehensive collective learning processes that 
resulted in serial, and cumulatively radical, redefinitions of policy 
parameters” (Heilmann 2008b: 21–22). What he dubs a “point-to-sur-
face approach” gave  
room to local officials to develop models on their own, while ul-
timate control over confirming, revising, terminating and spread-
ing model experiments rests with top-level decision makers. 
(Heilmann 2008a: 2)  
Zhu conceptualised a similarly rationalised experimentation and 
learning process in which “competition in the performance evalua-
tion-based personnel system [of lower-level cadres] contributes to the 
formation of ‘championship policy diffusion’” (Zhu 2014: 117). 
Against this assumption of well-coordinated, technocratic, and effi-
ciency-oriented learning in China, Teets (2016: 89) objected that pol-
icy diffusion within the country can be inefficient or outright contra-
dictory, since local government officials are better understood as 
“policy entrepreneurs” pursuing their own agendas. Nonetheless, her 
study of elderly care policies in China provides further evidence for 
the prevalence of vertical and horizontal domestic policy learning and 
the diffusion of successful policies across different localities and lev-
els of governments there. 
The discussion above has highlighted convincing examples for 
both international and domestic learning in modern Chinese policy-
making. However, these processes have mostly been analysed sepa-
rately in different studies, while the ways in which learning from for-
eign examples and learning through subnational experimentation 
interact and eventually converge into policy changes at the national 
level have not been systematically addressed. I shall thus now turn to 
the specific case of civil society policymaking, to combine both per-
spectives under the typological framework introduced earlier. 
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&KLQD¶V&KDQJLQJ&LYLO6RFLHW\5HJXODWRU\
(QYLURQPHQW
In March and April 2016, the Charity Law and the FNGO Law were 
adopted by the National People’s Congress within a couple of weeks 
of each other. As the first formal laws in a field formerly governed by 
provisional regulations, government opinions, and differing local 
regulatory and implementation practices, both have been described as 
ground-breaking and disruptive – albeit for different reasons. From 
the outset, the two laws have appeared to point in opposite direc-
tions: The FNGO Law, whose purview covers a vast range of foreign 
entities from advocacy groups to international friendship associations 
and chambers of commerce, came as an unpleasant surprise to many. 
It was overwhelmingly interpreted as an unprecedented regulatory 
crackdown on ICSOs, which had been able to operate in a scarcely 
regulated grey area for decades (Deng 2010: 190; Shieh 2018). By 
contrast, the Charity Law – designed as a new option for domestic 
“lawfully established non-profit organisations [NPOs]” (Article 8) to 
obtain preferential status as “charity organisations” – had been prior 
discussed for over a decade and eagerly expected in a non-profit sec-
tor toiling under cumbersome registration processes (Hildebrandt 
2011) as well as onerous tax provisions (Hu and Guo 2016: 216). 
However, the following policy process-tracing will show how both 
laws represent facets of a new, ambiguous governance approach in-
formed by – partly contradictory – lessons drawn from different 
sources. Table 2 below provides a succinct summary of the empirical 
findings regarding different types of policy learning in recent Chinese 
civil society regulations. 
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5HJXODWLRQV
Chinese civil 
society policy 
learning 
Positive Negative 
From other 
authoritarian 
states 
Weak 
Few “good” examples 
reconciling control over 
ICSOs with international 
soft power ambitions 
 
Singapore Model not related 
to civil society; “Russia 
model” not attractive; some 
parallels with Vietnam and 
Cambodia 
 
Scope and content of admin-
istrative exchanges unknown 
Strong 
Strong signalling effect of  
Colour Revolutions and 
Arab Spring 
 
Many Chinese analyses 
highlight “infiltration” by 
ICSOs in other autocratic 
countries 
From democra-
tic states 
Moderate 
Partial appropriation of  
capitalist charity model and 
“pluralist” foreign policy 
 
Study trips to US, 
philanthropy exchanges 
 
Reinterpretation of US soft 
power and public diplomacy 
within the Belt and Road 
Initiative 
Weak 
Chinese media exploiting 
protest movements in Wes-
tern democracies, but no 
apparent learning 
From domestic 
experiences / 
subnational 
models 
Strong 
Extensive lower-level policy 
experimentation with CSO 
regulations 
 
Yunnan pilot regulations as 
blueprint for FNGO Law 
 
Path dependency in state–
society relations at national 
level 
Weak 
Few real security problems 
with CSOs within China 
 
Domestic experiences do not 
explain hardening of civil 
society policies 
6RXUFH$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSLODWLRQ
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The characteristic features of a supposedly coordinated global “push-
back” against civil society, as identified by Carothers, include severe 
funding restrictions, “intimidating international groups through legal 
and extra-legal harassment,” creating a climate in which “recipients of 
foreign funding are intimidated and publicly delegitimized,” using 
“tax laws [and] invasive auditing procedures” to “harass NGOs,” 
creating “opaque registration procedures to accuse international 
groups of violating official NGO regulations,” and “inhibiting part-
nerships with local organizations” (Carothers 2016: 361f.). From an 
output-oriented perspective, the FNGO Law indeed displays several 
common elements with (anti-)NGO laws in Russia, Belarus, Cambo-
dia, or Azerbaijan. This is notably true for new restrictions prohibit-
ing foreign funding of “political activities” (Art. 5/2), increased regis-
tration hurdles, and intrusive governmental supervision competencies 
(Lang and Holbig 2018: 3). 
The most widely noticed change concerns the shift of regulatory 
oversight from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) to the Ministry of 
Public Security (MPS). This fundamental change was apparently de-
cided by the new National Security Commission (NSC), headed by 
President Xi himself, during its first session in April 2014 (Shieh 
2018: 6). Although the internal motivations of top-level leaders within 
the NSC are unobservable, this shift towards viewing ICSOs primari-
ly as a threat to “national security” (i.e. regime stability) is remindful 
of measures taken by other illiberal regimes since the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring revolutions in 2011 (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). In 
conjunction with insights from leaked internal party documents 
(Chinafile 2013; China Digital Times 2013), it can be inferred that the 
Xi administration aims to shield itself from a perceived infiltration by 
“Western values” (㾯ᯩԧ٬㿲 , xifang jiazhiguan) – that, however, 
without losing the benefits that come with international cooperation 
in the non-profit sector (Xie 2011). 
Negative authoritarian learning played a crucial role herein inso-
far as the – supposed – role of ICSOs in the Colour Revolutions and 
the Arab Spring uprisings contributed to shifting Chinese intellectual 
discourse and the internal power balance within the CCP towards 
mistrust of Western “civil society” actors during the first decade of 
the new millennium. The FNGO Law itself, however, was presented 
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as a constructive effort at effective regulation rather than a govern-
ment response to alleged infiltration by “foreign agents.” Subsequent 
internal analyses of the Law’s implementation equally focus on the 
regulatory effectiveness issue, highlighting both the advantages for 
ICSOs as compared to under the previous “legal void” (⌅ᖻオⲭ, 
falü kongbai) and also the need for adjustments to deal with bureau-
cratic registration issues (Ye and Huang 2018: 209–213). 
The Charity Law’s listing, meanwhile, of vaguely worded provi-
sions against undesired organisations which allegedly “endanger na-
tional security and society’s public interests” (Art. 15) could be seen 
as a further parallel to arguments used in other authoritarian countries 
too. But this wording also has a long tradition in CCP policy docu-
ments and, as opposed to with FNGO Law Art. 5, domestic CSOs 
are not explicitly prohibited from engaging in “political activities.” 
The exclusion of religious activities from the realm of “charity” (᝸ழ, 
cishan) was made explicit with the enactment of new, far more restric-
tive “Religious Affairs Regulations” (ᇇᮉһ࣑ᶑֻĭ zongjiao shiwu tiao-
li) in February 2018. The contemporaneous crackdown on “foreign” 
religions, notably Islam and Christianity, across China, while also 
potentially building on lessons from abroad, is beyond this article’s 
scope. Conversely, the exclusion of such “suspicious” activities con-
firms that the Charity Law in itself is intended as a constructive 
framework for those organisations working within its purview. 
As the most frequently cited source of Chinese “authoritarian-
positive” learning, Russia has passed increasingly restrictive and hos-
tile laws on NGOs (2006), on “Foreign Agents” (2012), and on “Un-
desirable Foreign Organisations” (2015) of late (Gilbert 2016). Rus-
sia’s “unfortunately effective crackdown on civil society” is widely 
seen as having “had much broader and more nefarious consequen-
ces” (Hooper and Frolov 2016: 12) on a global scale. The Sino–Rus-
sian rapprochement in recent years has piqued IR scholars’ interest in 
elucidating the growing number of exchanges between Chinese and 
Russian leaders and bureaucrats on a wide range of issues. The gen-
eral picture, however, is more one of an asymmetric relationship, with 
the economically and socially much more unstable Russia acquiescing 
to a “junior” role and trying to learn from China’s apparent govern-
ance successes (Kaczmarski 2018).  
Explicitly comparing the Chinese FNGO law with its Russian 
predecessors, Plantan argued that several similarities regarding con-
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tent and political intention mean that Russia’s present could “fore-
shadow China’s future” (Plantan 2017). But Chinese policy docu-
ments and research articles provide little support for the idea that 
state–society relations within Vladimir Putin’s electoral autocracy are 
actually seen in China as a positive model. With its flailing economy 
and a political system that appears far more unstable, riddled with 
social protests and the political influence of powerful oligarchs, the 
“Russia Model” (״㖇ᯟ⁑ᔿ, Eluosi moshi) has overwhelmingly nega-
tive connotations in Chinese debates and serves mostly as a foil used 
for unflattering comparisons with the “China Model” (Li and Li 
2018). 
In light of the above discussion, another likely model for Chi-
nese positive authoritarian learning is Singapore. However, the city 
state did not pass any significant pieces of new restrictive legislation 
serving as potential inspiration for Chinese laws. Furthermore, in 
Chinese civil society debates Singapore is almost never mentioned as 
a point of reference. This could be explained by the vastly different 
trajectories of state–society relations, with Singapore entirely lacking 
China’s historical background of totalitarian Maoism with omnipres-
ent mass organisations.  
A potential model with far more similarities to communist China 
in these regards is Vietnam. The term “Vietnam Model” (䎺ই⁑ᔿ, 
Yuenan moshi) does appear in Chinese debates, however only with 
reference to a potential model for the political relations of a com-
munist party regime with the Vatican. Despite decade-long delibera-
tions, Vietnam still has not passed its proposed “Law on Associa-
tions.” A new “Decree on Associations” effected in 2010 naturally 
upheld the party state’s supremacy and apparently aimed to foster the 
development of domestic NGOs under state-controlled “umbrella 
organisations” (Wischermann 2011) in ways similar to China. Prom-
ulgated in 2012, Decree 12 on “Registration and Management of 
International NGO Operations in Vietnam” bears similarities with 
China’s FNGO Law but does not break with an informal and flexible 
case-by-case governance approach more reminiscent of China’s pre-
vious “hidden rules” (Deng 2010). Apart from the post-Soviet coun-
tries, the only other one to pass a similar “Law on Associations and 
Non-Governmental Organisations” shortly before China did was 
Hun Sen’s increasingly authoritarian Cambodia, in 2015. Yet the law 
only attracted major attention in China in 2017 when the Cambodian 
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government used it to shutter the US-based National Democratic 
Institute in 2017 (Zhu 2017). 
In terms of policy communication, China’s approach differs 
most markedly from other countries with similar restrictive laws. This 
is especially so compared to internationally much-debated cases like 
the Russian and Hungarian governments’ ostentatious attacks against 
ICSOs as alleged “foreign agents” or “conspirators.” The Chinese 
government, by contrast, endeavoured to appease international criti-
cism from the outset. When the FNGO Law’s first public draft was 
made available “for public comment” in July 2015, a government 
spokesperson emphasised that: 
Swathes of FNGOs have made positive contributions to China’s 
friendly relations with the world, promoting China’s economic de-
velopment and social progress […]. The Chinese government will 
continue to welcome and support FNGOs coming to China. (Guo 
Shengkun, quoted in Xinhua 2015; author’s own translation)  
Thus, while passing new legislation generally perceived as distrustful 
and hostile towards the foreign civil society sector, Chinese authori-
ties have openly praised foreign organisations’  “high level of profes-
sionalism” as “worthy of our learning and emulation” (Jiefang Ribao 
2015).  
During the FNGO Law’s early implementation phase, the MPS 
and regional public security bureaus held various certification ap-
proval ceremonies for registered ICSOs in an apparent attempt to 
send out positive signals regarding continued interest in international 
cooperation. This was complemented by a series of media success 
stories highlighting each instance of new FNGO registrations as 
proof for the Law’s smooth implementation. Meanwhile, the regularly 
updated and easily accessible public whitelist of registered FNGOs 
(MPS 2018a) represents a step towards increased operational trans-
parency not only for state agents but also for the wider public – as it 
facilitates empirical analyses of (official) FNGO activities in China, as 
well as direct engagement with those actors. This Chinese focus on 
“whitelisting” organisations contrasts with Russia’s public blacklisting 
of “foreign agents” and “undesirable organisations” – a practice 
clearly intent on publicly shaming and blaming foreigners for desta-
bilising Russia’s political system.  
Chinese authorities regularly quote staff from registered FNGOs 
praising the “convenient service measures” (ׯ࡙ᴽ࣑᧚ᯭ, bianli fuwu 
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cuoshi) provided during registration (MPS 2018b). This general soft 
communication approach to selling a restrictive law is, however, con-
tradicted by intermittent media articles depicting individual “malig-
nant” ICSOs – notably religious and smaller human rights groups – 
as endangering China’s national or “political security” (᭯⋫ᆹޘ , 
zhengzhi anquan) (Renmin Ribao 2019). In reality, implementation has 
remained ambivalent: Most major ICSOs sailed through the registra-
tion process thanks to solid political connections and sufficient or-
ganisational resources to overcome the new bureaucratic hurdles. For 
smaller NGOs, however, the requirement to find a government-
approved “Professional Supervisory Unit” (PSU) to oversee and 
vouch for their activities represents a major hurdle, mainly because 
these (mostly governmental) agencies face few incentives and many 
political risks in assuming responsibility for a foreign organisation – 
except for technology exchanges or trade promotion.  
The government’s resolve to present its policies as a positive 
contribution to the non-profit sector’s development and growth is 
even more obvious with regard to the Charity Law: the Law dedicates 
a whole chapter (IX) to “Promotional Measures,” and Art. 88 expli-
citly calls on the state, schools, and media to “actively publicise chari-
table activities” and “promote a culture of charity.” In sum, with 
positive messages about “charitable services” (᝸ழᴽ, cishan fuwu) and 
“volunteers” (ᘇᝯ㘵, zhiyuanzhe) clearly outweighing negative propa-
ganda about harmful NGOs, the Chinese official discourse on ICSOs 
departs from the “vilification” (Carothers 2016: 362) of foreign-fund-
ed NGOs commonly identified as a key element of authoritarian civil 
society laws. 
/HDUQLQJIURP'HPRFUDFLHV³6RIW3RZHU´DQG&KDULW\
5HJXODWLRQ
The impact of policy transfer from Western ICSOs on the develop-
ment of China’s grass-roots civil society has been well documented 
(Han 2011; Spires 2012). However, the English-language literature 
has given little attention conceptually to diffusion and learning pro-
cesses at government level, despite many US foundations’ sustained 
efforts since the 1990s to spark “democratic learning” processes 
among Chinese officials through demonstration and socialisation 
effects (He and Yang 2013). Indeed, policy diffusion theories usually 
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assume that governments are far more likely to learn from culturally 
and politically similar regimes (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007: 
453), since “policy innovations will not uniformly appeal to all politi-
cal regime types” and “may prove incompatible with the already exist-
ing policy arrangements” (Tosun and Croissant 2016: 536; Elkins and 
Simmons 2005). However, the Chinese leadership’s enduring deter-
mination to catch up with Western countries by emulating their ap-
parently successful policies appears to have overridden this general 
tendency. Chinese bureaucrats’ and scholars’ eagerness to learn from 
US policies, particularly regarding the regulatory environment and tax 
regime for private charitable organisations, was proven by numerous 
official delegation visits to US civil society study centres and govern-
ment departments during the first decade of the new century. 
An analysis of Chinese-language academic debates on “civil soci-
ety” (ޜ≁⽮Պ, gongmin shehui) substantiates this overriding orienta-
tion towards Western countries – and notably the US model. Where-
as the above-mentioned Colour Revolutions accentuated fears among 
CCP hardliners of an apparent democratic contagion and thus pro-
vided arguments for restraining democratic influences from abroad, 
Chinese analysts showed a far greater interest in the role of ICSOs 
within US foreign policy strategy than in the reactions of the authori-
tarian governments concerned (Lang 2018). Thus, while a growing 
number of analysts since 2004 have portrayed ICSOs as a “tool of US 
‘democracy promotion’” (Zhong 2005: 67) or a “challenge for the 
stability and development of Central Asian societies” (Li and Liu 
2005: 38), US support for ICSOs is overwhelmingly portrayed as an 
“effective” means of promoting “Western values” or “Westernisa-
tion” (㾯ᯩॆ, xifanghua) (Wen 2007: 58; Ma 2015).  
In other words, ICSOs are interpreted as an important compo-
nent of US “soft power.” The frequent use of positive learning terms 
like “lessons for China” or “learning from experience” (ཊᡁഭⲴ੟
⽪, dui woguo de qishi, ُ䢤……㓿傼, jiejian...jingyan) in related analyses 
further testifies to Chinese elites’ conscious scrutiny of democratic 
governments’ own civil society policies vis-à-vis possible imitation 
and adaptation. Indeed, the regulation (instead of “simple” repres-
sion) of a sizeable civil society sector is a political issue in a world 
where democratic countries provide far more related examples and 
potential models than autocracies do. Democratic and authoritarian 
governments alike are required to set out an effective legal framework 
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for the work of NGOs or charitable foundations, even if these states’ 
ultimate objectives may differ markedly. After all, US support for civil 
society abroad may well be motivated by a firm commitment to pro-
moting democratic norms; however, the complications and foreign 
policy risks involved in this endeavour have also led US government 
agencies to step up controls ensuring that US funding is not used 
against American interests – not least by preferring US-originating 
NGOs as grantees over local civil society groups in target countries 
(Bush 2016; Schade 2010). These empirical complexities help explain 
why even authoritarian policymakers turn to democratic models for 
selective learning, as they are confronted with a burgeoning civil soci-
ety sector that they wish to steer and control rather than oppress.  
The forced decline of direct references to “civil society” follow-
ing the circulation of the hardline “Document N° 9” (Chinafile 2013) 
undoubtedly reflects the leadership’s negative learning from alleged 
“Western infiltration” in other authoritarian countries. But the con-
comitant rise of the “charity” concept – formerly vilified as imperial-
ist and anti-socialist (Luova 2017) – points to another important 
change in the leadership’s views on the sector: Back in 2006, the 
MCA released an initial draft for a “Charity Law,” actively soliciting 
input from experts within and outside China. For instance, individu-
als from the International Center for Civil Society Law were repeat-
edly invited by the MCA and the Ministry of Finance to provide input 
on tax issues related to charity regulation, and to submit written 
comments and suggestions for amending the draft law (ICCSL 2007). 
When the legislative process was suddenly suspended without expli-
cation, a rapidly growing body of Chinese literature argued that na-
tional-level civil society regulation was “lagging behind” (句⎶, luo-
hou) and turned to different aspects of the US charity regulation sys-
tem explicitly to “draw lessons for China” – including on “tax policy 
as a powerful lever for the development of American philanthropy” 
(Chen and Tan 2007: 77), public fundraising, or the regulatory man-
agement of corporate donations (Ge 2014).  
One widely cited analysis praised the US regulatory system’s 
“threefold effect” of “promotion,” “equal treatment,” and effective 
“supervision” of charity organisations and strongly made the case for 
its adaption to the Chinese context (Zhang 2007: 102). Another re-
curring point of reference has been the United Kingdom’s Charity 
Commission as a central body responsible for registering, guiding, 
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and reporting on charities (Wang Shiqiang 2012). Besides many tech-
nical questions, one key message from these analyses concerns the 
political inoffensiveness of (adequately regulated and supervised) 
philanthropic giving – which, rather than challenging government 
policies, contributes to the “public good,” and even increases socio-
economic stability by alleviating concerns about inequality within a 
capitalist system. Consequently, various Chinese government agencies 
continued invitations to, and consultations with, foreign (mostly 
American and British) tax experts for several years before eventually 
coming up with a renewed draft of Chinese charity legislation. 
These learning efforts from Anglo-Saxon countries have visibly 
materialised in the finalised Charity Law, which formally introduced 
the new concept of “charitable organisation” (literally translated as ᝸
ழ㓴㓷, cishan zuzhi). However, it somewhat awkwardly grafted relat-
ed common law provisions upon China’s civil law system – within 
which distrust towards private legal persons acting in the “public 
interest” (℔䙲gongyi) remains deeply engrained (Pissler and Hippel 
2006). Another example for international learning is apparent in Art. 
7, which stipulates the creation of an annual “China Charity Day” on 
5 September each year – explicitly modelled after the “International 
Day of Charity” declared by the United Nations in 2012. Yet the 
official explanatory note also refers, starting with Shenzhen Charity 
Day in 2008, to previous local examples in Chinese provinces – 
which are thus officially sanctioned as a successful means of “mobil-
ising the public to participate in charity.” 
Beyond official bureaucratic learning, Western ideas about chari-
ty have also diffused into China by other channels too. In terms of 
research and capacity-building for the nascent domestic charity sec-
tor, Chinese scholars turned to American model institutions – notably 
the Foundation Center, which disposes of the most detailed and in-
sightful database on philanthropic organisations worldwide thanks to 
extensive information disclosure requirements in US foundation law. 
Based on this model, the MCA passed “Measures for the Information 
Disclosure of Foundations” in 2006, requiring all Chinese founda-
tions to submit organisational information in an effort to increase 
transparency and foster the better understanding and development of 
China’s charity sector. In 2010, the “China Foundation Center” (ѝഭ
ส䠁Պѝᗳ, Zhongguo jijinhui zhongxin) – clearly modelled in structure 
and purpose after its homonymous US counterpart – was set up 
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jointly by 35 Chinese foundations, with substantial financial support 
from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation 
(China Development Brief 2019). American philanthropists like Bill 
Gates and Ray Dalio have also been personally committed to pro-
moting their belief in “giving back to society” among the rapidly 
growing community of billionaires in the PRC. Together with three 
Chinese philanthropists, they set up the China Global Philanthropy 
Institute in 2015. It “applies an international, practical, and innovative 
method to produce philanthropic knowledge” in China, mostly 
through applied research and capacity-building for Chinese NPOs via 
its offices in Shenzhen and Beijing (CGPI 2019). Inspired by their 
American peers, more and more Chinese “high-net-worth individu-
als” have pledged to donate substantial shares of their private for-
tunes to charitable causes in recent years (Cunningham 2017). 
Learning from democratic countries appears unlikely in the case 
of the FNGO Law, widely characterised as illiberal and anti-demo-
cratic. Some changes made between the second draft of July 2015 and 
the final text passed in April 2016 can be traced back to critical sug-
gestions submitted by foreign organisations and Chinese experts; they 
are mostly technical in nature though (Jia 2016), confirming the inef-
fectiveness of coercion mechanisms in the Chinese case. However, 
one clear motivation for voluntary learning about civil society policies 
can be found in China’s efforts to raise its international profile as part 
of President Xi’s “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Besides economic 
and geostrategic interests, the BRI aims to increase China’s “soft 
power” and international status (Callahan 2016) by promoting “people-
to-people connectivity” through collaboration between “people’s 
organisations” (≁䰤㓴㓷 , minjian zuhi) (He 2017). However, lofty 
ambitions to “let the people’s hearts communicate” (≁ᗳ⴨䙊, minxin 
xiangtong) (Xi 2017) are confronted with Chinese NGOs and philan-
thropic foundations’ limited capacities and international experiences 
(Deng 2017). This explains a perceived need for increased coopera-
tion with and learning from established ICSOs (Han 2011), which is 
increasingly reflected in government-supported transnational forums – 
such as the “Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum” created 
in 2017. Finally, the fact that charity foundations are considered part 
of civil society in the US enables Chinese authorities to showcase 
their will to promote civil society actors in conformity with interna-
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tional expectations through the Charity Law – while actually confin-
ing their sphere of influence to politically innocuous activities. 
'RPHVWLF/HYHO&DXWLRXV'LVVHPLQDWLRQRI/RZHU/HYHO
([SHULPHQWV
Chinese civil society policy has consistently dangled between cautious 
opening and the reassertion of state control. The proliferation of 
formally “non-governmental” organisations during the 1980s, which 
many Western observers interpreted as a sign of the diffusion of 
political liberalism to China, was from a Chinese bureaucratic per-
spective rather the result of a need to replace the outdated Maoist 
danwei system with complete state responsibility for welfare provision. 
This implied the outsourcing of social services to (semi-)private or-
ganisations (Whiting 1991). This fundamental transformation of 
state–society relations was a challenging process, and one in which 
references to international models of corporatism and civil society 
were intensively discussed (Han 2016).  
More importantly, however, subnational reforms and pilot 
schemes at the provincial and county levels would drive innovation in 
Chinese civil society policies in the absence of a clear national legal 
framework. Different models of “social management” (⽮Պ㇑⨶ , 
shehui guanli) emerged during the 1990s, pitting more liberal provinces 
like Guangdong and Yunnan against more restrictive local admin-
istrations in Beijing, Jiangsu, or Shanghai (Teets 2014: 159). This 
development of distinct local “models” of civil society management 
during the 1990s and first decade of the new century was rooted in 
China’s performance evaluation-based cadre system (Zhu 2014), under 
which local officials were assessed and promoted according to cen-
trally defined indicators – but enjoyed substantial autonomy in terms 
of how to achieve them. In this context of “performance-based de-
centralisation” (Shen and Yu 2017: 179) and diverse local circum-
stances, some subnational governments chose to empower NGOs due 
to their desirable contributions to social development, while others 
came to regard autonomous civil society groups as a threat to these 
objectives. Shen and Yu’s (2017: 189–190) comparative study con-
firms that local officials even explicitly explained their choices to 
promote or restrain civil society development by way of reference to 
learning from previous experiences with NGOs in their jurisdiction. 
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Local-level experiences have thus played a major role in the evo-
lution of China’s civil society policies, with the promotion of collabo-
rative local government–NGO engagement models by Western 
foundations as a mediating variable (Spires 2012). However, the per-
sistent power asymmetry within a staunchly authoritarian governance 
system means that local government “learning” from civil society in 
China also frequently takes the form of government agencies “ex-
ploiting” NGOs by giving them some leeway to experiment with 
innovative approaches, only to subsequently either disavow them or – 
in case of success – create their own, well-resourced “government-
organised NGOs” (GONGOs) to steal and copy their ideas (Has-
math and Hsu 2016: 112–117).  
The Charity Law’s stated goal is to “promote a charity culture”  
(ᕈᢜ᝸ழ᮷ॆĭ hongyang cishan wenhua) (Arts. 1 and 88/1) in society, 
focusing on two main areas: financial donations and volunteering. 
Experimentation with allowing and promoting the development of 
charity organisations already started in the 1990s (Luova 2017). In 
addition to national GONGOs, several provincial governments initi-
ated their own NPOs to raise additional funds for social welfare pur-
poses. Experimentation with more favourable regulations to encour-
age a greater number of citizens to volunteer started back in 2005 
with Shenzhen’s Volunteer Regulation being a local pioneer (Simon 
2008: 982). Beijing and Shanghai followed up with similar volunteer 
regulations ahead of two key events: the Beijing Olympics in 2008 
and the Shanghai World Expo 2010. The inadequacy of rigid registra-
tion requirements for volunteer organisations in dealing with un-
planned events, which became apparent in the wake of the Wenchuan 
earthquake, contributed to national-level policymakers considering a 
liberalisation of the onerous registration system for certain CSOs in 
selected policy areas. While national-level progress on a formal Chari-
ty Law stalled after 2006, the MCA engaged in an “experimentation 
regime” under which it “signed open and transparent agreements 
with several provinces and municipalities for ‘experiments’ regarding 
loosening the legal environment for CSOs” (Simon 2011: 59). Shen-
zhen’s 2009 agreement with the MCA on “advancing overall reforms 
to civil society undertakings” served as a pilot for waiving the rigid 
“dual registration” requirement (Hsu and Hasmath 2013: 524), fol-
lowed by province-level try-outs in Guangdong which were officially 
disseminated by the MCA in 2012 (Xinhua 2012).  
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Local pilot schemes have also served as a way to test a new, am-
biguous governance approach best characterised as “promote and 
control.” Essentially, this approach is aimed at expanding the delivery 
of social services by private charities while simultaneously increasing 
their dependency on the state. Thus, Beijing Municipality’s pioneering 
large-scale procurement of social services from NGOs, first an-
nounced in 2011 (Florini, Lai, and Tan 2012: 100), was subsequently 
imitated by other local governments before informing a new national 
strategy which Kang has characterised as “administrative absorption 
of society” (Kang 2018: 4). Eventually, the State Council’s “Guiding 
Opinions on Promoting Healthy Development of Charities” con-
firmed the double objective of “encouraging all parts of society to 
engage in charitable activities” while “strengthening oversight and 
control over charitable organisations and charitable activities” (State 
Council 2014). These authoritative Opinions paved the way for adopt-
ing the Charity Law, framed in terms of national development and 
the “cultivation of citizens’ charitable consciousness” (ษ㛢ޜ≁᝸ழ
᜿䇶, peiyu gongmin cishan yishi) (Art. 88/1). The second component of 
the envisaged “charity culture,” meaning the encouragement of pri-
vate donations to charitable activities, equally builds on positive les-
sons from a coordinated policy experiment with public fundraising in 
nine provinces and municipalities starting in 2010 (Hu and Guo 2016: 
217). One key lesson learnt from these experiments – similar to the 
above-described ones garnered from the US model – is that home-
grown charities do not represent a form of serious competition to the 
party state, but rather strive to support government policies in fact. 
Despite the FNGO Law’s perception as an epochal change, sev-
eral features of it are much more in continuity with previous Chinese 
regulatory practices than has generally been appreciated in interna-
tional discussions. Notably, the widely criticised “dual management 
system” – involving the need for CSOs to find a “supervisory unit” – 
is typical of Chinese civil society management, and had been first 
applied to the domestic non-profit sector decades earlier (Simon 
2011: 59–61; Deng 2010), with similar problems regarding the lack of 
incentives for potential supervisory agencies (Hasmath and Hsu 2016: 
110). For foreign foundations working in China, meanwhile, similar 
registration requirements had formally applied since 2004 under the 
“Regulations on Foundation Management” – however with little 
pressure to actually go through the cumbersome bureaucratic pro-
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cess. The extremely low share of foreign organisations registered 
under these regulations pushed the MCA to initiate a pilot pro-
gramme to register foreign NGOs in Yunnan Province in 2009 (Ye 
and Huang 2018: 208).  
Provincial officials openly acknowledged their objective being 
“to regulate civil society activity to balance the benefits from interna-
tional resources with the risks posed by groups with perceived un-
known intentions” (Hsu and Teets 2016). “Yunnan Province’s provi-
sional regulations standardizing the activities of overseas non-
governmental organisations” (China Development Brief 2014) al-
ready featured many bureaucratic burdens that later dismayed critics 
of the FNGO Law, including staff-hiring restrictions, intrusive super-
vision competencies, and frequent reporting to different government 
departments. Indeed, the first draft of the FNGO Law contains many 
passages directly inspired by the Yunnan pilot regulations. These 
include the need for FNGOs to seek approval and support from their 
Chinese “professional supervisory unit” (ъ࣑ѫ㇑অս, yewu zhuguan 
danwei) on virtually all aspects of organisational management, staff 
details, and programme planning before even going to the registration 
authorities (FNGO Law Arts. 11, 12, 14, 27, 31, 40; Yunnan Reg. 
Arts. 11, 14, 25), restrictions on political and religious activities 
(FNGO Law Art. 5 (2); Yunnan Reg. Art. 13), the requirement that 
FNGOs contribute to “public welfare” and socio-economic devel-
opment (FNGO Law Art. 10 (3); Yunnan Reg. Art. 6), as well as 
many technical stipulations such as the long list of documents re-
quired for filing an application (FNGO Law Arts. 12, 17; Yunnan 
Reg. Art. 7) or immediate reporting requirements for even minor 
changes made to programme and financial planning (FNGO Law 
Art. 19; Yunnan Reg. Art. 9). Despite these onerous provisions, the 
number of registered ICSOs in Yunnan Province alone quickly ex-
ceeded those hitherto registered in the whole country, and the ab-
sence of a public backlash equally qualified the Yunnan regulations as 
a “model for national policy” (Shieh 2018: 5) even before Xi came to 
power.  
By contrast, evidence of negative learning from domestic experi-
ences with civil society actors is scant in the Chinese case. Far from 
challenging the CCP’s authority, most foreign and domestic CSOs 
have rather sought to engage in constructive policy dialogues with 
government representatives (Xie 2011; He and Yang 2013). Even the 
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kind of rights-based advocacy which has come to be seen as a “hos-
tile force” among the CCP leadership is primarily oriented towards 
enforcing existing rights and legal safeguards within China’s current 
constitutional order. Consequently, the narrative of supposedly hos-
tile Western interference and subversion of autocratic governments 
with the help of local CSOs in Chinese debates is almost exclusively 
substantiated with examples from Central Asia and the Middle East 
instead (Ma 2015; Wang Zhen 2012; Wen 2007). Thus, negative do-
mestic learning contributes little to explaining the more restrictive 
elements of the new legal framework. 
&KLQD¶V1HZ*RYHUQDQFH$SSURDFK
Considering the FNGO Law’s substantive similarities with a preced-
ing domestic policy experiment, its important “innovations” concern 
specifically the unexpected transfer of supervision competence from 
the MCA to the MPS. Additionally significant is the fact that it was 
passed as formal legislation in 2016, breaking with a decade-long 
practice of more flexible and discretionary administrative regulations. 
One fundamental change for ICSOs since 2017 has been the much 
higher pressure to go through the formal registration process (Lang 
and Holbig 2018), since Chinese regulators appear no longer willing 
to tolerate the grey-area activities characteristic of the previous in-
formal governance approach (Deng 2010; Hildebrandt 2011). The 
additional restrictions and intrusive supervision rights certainly reflect 
the security apparatus’ heightened distrust of ICSOs. Yet despite the 
Charity Law’s more “constructive” nature and far more positive ini-
tial reception within the non-profit sector, both laws are ultimately 
embedded in the same “promote and control” logic. Such a more 
repressive and security-focused but also more law-based regulatory 
approach to CSOs conforms with the CCP’s overall efforts to govern 
and control a modern, capitalist, and pluralistic society based on the 
dictatorial principles of an “upgraded” Leninist one-party system 
(Heilmann 2016). This implies a delicate balancing act between the 
regime’s quest for complete control over society and its desire to spur 
societal innovation and use the “positive contributions” (〟ᶱ䍑⥞, 
jiji gongxian) (Xinhua 2015) of civil society for its own purposes, which 
arguably lacks convincing international predecessors or models to 
learn from. 
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Moreover, President Xi’s persistent efforts to recentralise deci-
sion-making in conjunction with a sustained, intimidating anti-cor-
ruption and disciplinary campaign have significantly reduced lower-
level cadres’ leeway in experimenting with own, innovative govern-
ance approaches. The distinct local models identified earlier by sever-
al observers (Heilmann 2008a; Teets 2013; Zhu 2012; Zhu 2014) have 
thus been washed out. Alternatively, as with the Yunnan regulations, 
they have been integrated into a national framework. 
&RQFOXVLRQ
Seen in conjunction, China’s two new civil society laws do not fall 
neatly in line with the core characteristics of the perceived interna-
tional “pushback.” Applying the proposed typological framework of 
authoritarian learning, the empirical analysis of the Chinese policy 
process has confirmed the relevance of international learning, but 
also called into question the prevalence of cooperation among or 
positive learning from authoritarian regimes. Instead, identified in-
stances of authoritarian learning mainly fall into the “domestic-posi-
tive” and “authoritarian-negative” categories, being complemented by 
“democratic-positive” learning on charity regulation.  
To some extent, domestic and international learning have yielded 
contradictory lessons for the Chinese leadership: Positive domestic 
experiences from gradually facilitated engagement between local offi-
cials and the civil society sector stand in contrast with negative les-
sons from other authoritarian regimes supposedly being undermined 
by foreign civil society funding. Despite the CCP security apparatus’s 
growing distrust of non-state actors, observations regarding the role 
of CSOs and particularly that of charity organisations in Western 
democracies have provided inspirations for Chinese policymakers 
looking for innovative means of reaching their own “social develop-
ment” objectives. Thus, the Charity Law somewhat inconsistently 
combines lessons from democratic countries and domestic policy 
experimentation with regulatory conservatism motivated by negative 
international lessons. 
The “authoritarian-positive” category remains a methodological 
challenge. Output similarity – which exists to some extent between 
the Chinese FNGO Law and its supposed forerunners in Russia and 
elsewhere – is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing 
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authoritarian learning. The occurrence of actual authoritarian learning 
and cooperation, especially at lower bureaucratic levels, remains ex-
tremely hard to ascertain because even if the regime drew lessons 
from successful restrictive measures elsewhere there would be no 
incentive to openly discuss this. This limitation notwithstanding, the 
problematic fixation on comparing subsequent policy outputs in au-
thoritarian diffusion studies (Erdmann et al. 2013) is mitigated by a 
more comprehensive analysis of domestic policy processes and relat-
ed public debates, one which is attentive to learning from alternative, 
complementary, or contradictory experiences at different levels.  
The present analysis suggests that the main international diffu-
sion mechanism responsible for shrinking civil society spaces is one 
of regimes’ parallel learning from ICSOs’ seemingly effective role in 
challenging other authoritarian regimes abroad. Lessons for necessary 
“countermeasures” are drawn according to local contexts, domestic 
incentives, and bureaucrats’ lived experiences. In the case of China, 
the local context has so far favoured a more restrictive and surveil-
lance-based – but not openly aggressive – approach to ICSOs in par-
allel with a promotion of politically non-sensitive, domestic social 
organisations that are meant to progressively replace foreign funding 
in the public welfare sector. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the analysis confirms that both ex-
clusively domestically focused and purely IR-oriented approaches 
tend to overestimate the relative importance of either country-
specific idiosyncrasies or international policy transfer respectively. 
Those divergent approaches should thus henceforth be more system-
atically integrated, to offset their respective shortcomings. While a 
single-country case is obviously not representative of authoritarian 
learning mechanisms in general, future research could build on this 
analysis to further explore how different variables – such as the type 
of authoritarian system or internal and external regime security – 
influence the relative importance of, and interplay between, the six 
types of authoritarian learning that have been discussed here.
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